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The “Black Sounds” of Ene Mihkelson’s Katkuhaud 
(‘Plague Grave’) and W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz
Part I. Foundations 
MAIRE JAANUS
Fish swim, birds fly, people feel.
Heim G. Ginott
In Sebald’s Austerlitz, the protagonist’s childhood nurse, Vera, relates that she 
spent hours looking at mineral samples in the lapidarium, “wondering at the 
nature of the foundations on which our world is built” (Sebald 2001: 180).
Reading Ene Mihkelson and W. G. Sebald one feels there may be no more 
foundations. Their works reveal holes in a reality once filled with intelligibility 
and meaning. Their texts often fall as if into a void. It is only because holes 
have rims and edges to which one can cling1 that these narratives hold up 
and seem able to continue. It is by an arduous writing – by weighted words, 
abundant syntactic subordinations, and clauses in long and complex verbal 
chains, reminiscent of past eras of prose – that Mihkelson and Sebald build 
and procure for themselves rims to cling to and support on edges, surrounding 
1 “Saying the hole is the essential thing about the round does not entirely satisfy me. In 
fact, what is a hole if nothing surrounds it?” (Lacan 1974–1975)
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the void that Lacan called the real, or “the blank of sense” (Lacan 1974–1975, 
Lesson of March 11, 1975). 
In the universe of Aristotle and St. Augustine there were no holes. A black 
hole in the cosmos, a kind of vanishing point into which the universe may 
ultimately be swallowed, did not exist. For Stephen Hawking, “Black holes 
represent a physical singularity, that is to say, an exception, a place within 
space–time where the laws of the universe cease to apply” (Paz 1995: 202–
203). Lacan’s real (as opposed to what he called reality) is a theoretical attempt 
to name such a place of exception in the psychic domain. This psychic territory 
of the real – lawless, reasonless, and languageless – is where Mihkelson and 
Sebald struggle and take up arms. It is apprehended in extreme moments of 
consciousness when the powers of the mind cease to apply, when blankness 
invades the plane of reality, and opens fields of fearful emptiness.
By contrast, in the world of Aristotle and Augustine, powerful symbolic and 
imaginary pillars closed off both their cosmic and psychic world to emptiness. 
Reason and God were for them, respectively, the anchors that moored their 
being and filled all space and time. With these they knotted us to happiness. For 
Augustine, God was “the firm foundation” of his bliss. Unlike human speech 
uttered in time, God’s sacred Word was out of time, in an eternity “where 
nothing moves into the past”, where “all is present”, and that, so Augustine 
believed, is what we long for: “union with the eternal presence of eternity and 
with God, the ultimate Good” (1962: 259–261).
For Aristotle likewise, the highest good, the summum bonum, was that 
towards which all that exists strives (1976: 63). But Aristotle did not think that 
we could have eternal bliss, which was reserved for the gods in their rational 
purity. We could, however, with hard work and luck have happiness, a rational 
happiness, such as “by itself makes life desirable” (ibid. 74). The Nicomachean 
Ethics was his teaching of how the hybrid being or “rational animal” that we are 
could hold in check its irrationality or animal side so as to attain this desired 
state. For Aristotle, reason and happiness were inexorably tied, and the special 
condition and function that distinguished men from animals.2 It was our final 
cause or reason for living: “If we consider what the function of man is, we find 
that happiness is a virtuous activity of the soul in accordance with or implying 
a rational principle.” (Ibid. 75–76)
Aristotle believed in entelechy,3 in the possibility of a movement from an 
unformed state to a state of full realization, completion, or perfection. This 
2 To Aristotle it seemed that animals, lacking reason, could not be happy.
3 Greek entelekheia from en=within + telos=end, perfection + ekhein=to be in a certain 
state.
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active movement, to which we needed to devote our efforts, was a matter 
of knowledge (gnô sis), which for Aristotle encompassed a wide range of 
cognitive states from perceptual recognition to a scientific knowledge of the 
four causes (the material, formal, efficient, and final cause) and of the eternal 
first principles. Further, “to know” entailed “to know how to do”4, or to act. It 
included a knowledge of technê – the skill, craft, or art of making all the levels 
of knowing operate accurately together – and beyond that a knowing of how 
to use and apply them in one’s personal, social, and political life. Thus, much 
education, knowledge, training, practice, and repetition were necessary to put 
the rational soul in action. But such a formation and development of our reason 
and its application were for him the indispensible foundation of our chance 
for happiness. However, for the highest happiness, one needed in addition to a 
perfected rationality and a prudent moral practice – luck, health, wealth, and 
friendship. 
What was closed off with Aristotle and Augustine’s conceptions of 
foundational causes was the possibility that human beings were uncaused, 
as if accidental or contingent, thrown into Dasein haphazardly and incapable 
of knowing their cause or final goal. What was cut off was the idea that there 
may be no entelechy: no purposive, orderly movement from potentiality to 
realization; and no foundational divine, vital, or “rational principle” that guided 
the functioning, development, and coming to fruition of human beings, nature, 
or the cosmos. What was cut off as well was a blunt answer such as Freud gave 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: “The aim of all life is death,” a fact that seemed 
to him “a truth beyond exception” (Freud 1920: 38–39).
Aristotle’s definition of man as a rational animal, destined for rational 
happiness, also cut out a full analysis of the other half of his being, his animal 
side, his evolutionary history, his primitivism, his instincts for survival, his 
drives for sexual and other pleasures, his deep, emotional roots and needs, and 
his excessive, reason-defying passions that can excite and move him towards 
sublime experiences, expressions, and enactments at once of unbelievable 
goodness or evil. We have texts, and ample testimony in history, attesting to 
our enjoyment (jouissance) both of a saintly and a criminal sublime, with the 
latter utterly indifferent to what Aristotle called “the virtuous activity of the 
soul”. It is certainly not that Aristotle, the tutor of Alexander the Great, did not 
know the barbaric side of human nature, but that he relegated it to irrationality 
and abeastliness to which he knew or assumed his teachings in the Ethics could 
have no relevance or application. This left much about both human nature 
4 Epistasthai, a Greek cognate of epistêmê or knowledge.
Th e “Black Sounds” of Ene Mihkelson’s Katkuhaud d W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz
350
JAANUS
and animal nature for the scientists, artists, philosophers, psychoanalysts, and 
today’s neuroscientists, who followed him, to explore.
In about 1487, Leonardo da Vinci made his famous drawing of “The 
Vitruvian Man” also known as “The Canon of Proportions” that has for 
some time been an icon of Western man. In this drawing, da Vinci fitted the 
ideal human proportions that he derived from the ancient Roman architect, 
Vitruvius (as the writing around the drawing indicates), into the logic of two 
perfect geometric forms, the square and circle, the latter an ideal conf luence 
of beginnings and ends, and hence a perfect figure of containment and 
completion.5 This Vitruvian Man, this exemplary anthropos, the summit of 
creation, god’s final work on the seventh day of creation, this grandiose master of 
the universe and of all its inhabitants, this paragon, the culmination of the great 
chain of being, who is in perfect harmony and accord with nature – praises for 
whose eminence, freedom of choice, and power of self-making resound in Pico’s 
“Oration on the Dignity of Man” – what has happened to him? This exploiter, 
profiteer, and destroyer of the earth, who has caused infinite destruction, 
death, and grief – what more have we to fear from him? This self-proclaimed 
colossus, with his prodigious memory and demand for eternity, who claims to 
know causes, who believes his very thinking is in correlation with being as such 
and that an identity exists between the macrocosm and the microcosm that he 
himself is – this prodigy – when will his time and centricity be over? When 
will we stop admiring him? The long era of the reign of his fantastical, raging 
desires, infinite expectations, aspirations, conquests, his unending potential, 
his restless Hegelian becoming – something is evermore becoming, something 
more is ever about to be: globalism, multinational capitalism, universalism, and 
a f lourishing of science that will like magic solve all our problems and bring 
us the ultimately satisfying totality, the promise of happiness for all – when 
will it end? When will this balloon of an ever-expanding and all-encompassing 
happiness that he has been blowing for centuries burst? And when it does, 
what do we substitute for the failure of his lofty ideals, beliefs, hopes, and self-
confidence? If it is true that without visions, beliefs, and “the audacity of hope”, 
mankind will perish, what other visions might we invent and pursue? That is 
the question.
Ene Mihkelson and W. G. Sebald’s artistic work is deeply related to a 
broad-based, post-humanist effort to move this image of massive desires and 
fantasies, joined to ideals of competency and power, to a cultural graveyard. 
“Our species’ development to date,” says Mihkelson’s narrator, “is comparable 
5 Actually, the proportions did not fit but Da Vinci lengthened the man’s arms so that 
they would.
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to an uncontrollable earthquake or a volcanic eruption. When these occur, we 
run like a maddened crowd, stampeding each other to death, towards higher 
ground, where Noah is, I wanted to say, but I take that comparison back 
because I do not know from or to where we are running. Behind my omniscient 
clarity is the enigma of emptiness.” (Mihkelson 2007: 57)6 What is outside the 
sphere of traditional ethics or the natural lawfulness of the animal world – what 
is pathological, criminal, and transgressive of human reason and imagination – 
is the very substance of Mihkelson’s Katkuhaud (‘Plague Grave’). It is also 
what disturbs and does as if violence to her writing, thinking, and feeling in a 
traditional or discursive style. Her language as well as Sebald’s aims to evoke 
and record the extreme responses of their bodies and emotions to a world 
that, on the one hand, seems fundamentally unbalanced, discordant, and 
unwholesome and, on the other, deeply enigmatic, unknown, and uncharted in 
an unprecedented and radical way. 
Mihkelson and Sebald seem to know, without anyone telling them, what 
many neuroscientists have begun to point to. “We are not capable of pure 
thought; each piece of information we receive engages the body,” says John 
Coates.7 “The brain is not a computer, but a biological system; everything 
has a biological substrate,” concurs Rafael Yuste.8 To this we can add, from 
the important work of Jaak Panksepp, that no thoughts or perceptions come 
without affective reactions and the engagement of emotion, as I will discuss 
later. The brain and body are always active, not only in sleep, but even when 
we are in a coma or, as we previously believed, brain-dead. As long as our lungs 
move to bring oxygen to our circulating blood and our heart is beating, the 
brain is alive. The brain, with its phenomenal motility, plasticity, and capacity 
for forging new neural pathways, is always generating a world. It is a vast 
neurological network that “speaks” an “electrical language,” at least on one 
level, says John Medina. It converts an external source of energy, such as, for 
6 This and all subsequent translations of Katkuhaud (‘Plague Grave’) are my own. I thank 
Märt Väljataga for insistently turning my attention to Ene Mihkelson, and for kindly 
reviewing my translations, but always and above all for being such an inordinately sup-
portive and brilliant editor and translator and for aiding me in finding links to the most 
beautiful and poetic writings in my mother tongue.  
7 From notes taken at a lecture given by John M. Coates, a neuroscientist at Cam-
bridge University, England, and author of The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: Risk 
Taking, Gut Feelings and the Biology of Boom and Bust. London: Penguin Press, 
2012, at the Harvard Club, June 21, 2012.
8 Notes taken at a talk by Rafael Yuste, Professor of Neuroscience at Columbia Universi-
ty, for Café Science, an informal discussion group, led by Columbia University faculty, 
on July 9, 2012.
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example, light (or photons bouncing off an object) into what Medina calls, “a 
brain-friendly electrical language” and roots it to the visual cortex, engaging – 
with the aid of chemical messengers – millions of neurons and hundreds of 
different brain regions in the process (2008: 108–109), while generating 
physiological, emotional, and verbal reactions.
Such a vision of a bio-chemical-neurological foundation in dizzying 
motion does not put to rest the Vitruvian Man, dominated by his desires and 
his consciousness, with its ideational formations, and imaginary-symbolic 
representations that to him sometimes seem cut off from his organism, but 
it invites us to question our current philosophical, psychoanalytical, and 
medical models of the human mind and emotions and to ref lect on their 
interdependence. As yet, this new neuro-physiological foundation, with its 
perhaps indeterminable number of neuronal pathways is barely mapped. Once 
it is, the map will still be general and not specifically applicable to any singular 
being, who is actually at every moment making and unmaking his or her own 
brain map and neural roads. Thus, it is not surprising that those neuroscientists 
who are in the very midst of trying to comprehend how the brain and body 
operate together, warn, as Rafael Yuste for one has, that tampering directly 
with the brain by surgery or drugs is, at this point, “like trying to fix a car, 
without knowing how the engine works”. 
We want everything to work and to ignore everything that “doesn’t work or 
go well (ce qui ne va pas)”, which is one of the names the late Lacan called the 
real or the symptom. The real is the failure or f law or error in the system or the 
psychic structure. Thus, whereas we have since Aristotle concerned ourselves 
with f lourishing, “with living well and doing well” (66), Lacan concerns himself 
with “the symptom”, or with “what isn’t going well” (Lacan 2014: 71), as do 
Mihkelson and Sebald. Such symptoms and f laws are as if small emergences 
from the mind and body that call attention to impairments or threats to our 
well-being, safety, and survival, or they point to changes in our bio-chemistry 
that ready us for self-defensive actions, all in order to prevent us from drifting 
into the fantasm of a safe and secure “all”: that of being and having it all or of 
grasping and controlling it all. 
We need to value the error, says Mihkelson’s narrator (10), because in a 
world where everything is touted as possible, where there are no limits, the 
error alone points to a limit, to impossibility and impotence. Both she and 
Sebald understand the human proclivity to discount the error, the failure, or 
what doesn’t work. It is easier to regard any encounter with a ce qui ne va pas 
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as an irregular, chance event, an exception, or even as an “act of God”.9 It is 
preferable to see it as an isolated accident or as a single problem to be solved and 
corrected – not as something that is an inescapable part of our existence and 
structure that we need to count in as a constant, an equal power. Mihkelson 
and Sebald live with their incomprehension, fears, weaknesses, errors, sense 
of alarm, and despair. They are or let themselves be and feel what they do not 
want to be or feel. Their writings start from the symptoms. Errors (from the 
Latin errare – to stray, to go astray), mistakes, failures, losses, and screwed up 
situations (such as that of the removal of the Bronze Soldier from the center of 
Tallinn) are what challenge them to begin their work. Human error, straying, 
and erring are their inspiration. To them applies what Carl Jung once wrote: 
“One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making 
the darkness conscious.” (Jung 1945: 335)
Incertitude, lack of clarity, and errors are what most of us want to escape, and 
Descartes, for one, who had just about zero tolerance for any kind of fuzziness, 
worked to find a method of how to do away with it. He proposed tearing down 
his mind to its foundations, as one does a building, and rebuilding it brick by 
brick, as it were, with “clear and distinct ideas”, and according to a method that 
is equally “clear and distinct”, such as he outlined in his Discours de la méthode. 
Descartes wanted complete control of his mind and memory. He wanted firm 
and doubt-free “foundations that would be wholly mine” (Descartes 195: 9–10). 
Basically, what Descartes proposed was a scientific method that left out the 
subject altogether, in particular its language and emotions. As regards language, 
one could possibly speculate that he might actually have preferredthe reduced 
formula H2O, for example, for the word “water,” as that would purge it of all 
that Kant called “pathological” or of all the historical, personal, and emotional 
connotations that the word “water” could have for a human being. H2O gives 
us a chemical equation or a short notation for the chemical reactions between 
hydrogen gas and oxygen gas, and therewith, turns us away from language and 
our subjectivity towards the elemental and material. But minds and memories 
reduced to cognitions and formulas so cleansed, simplified, materialized, and 
objectified are, precisely, what Austerlitz and Mihkelson’s narrators do not 
have. What they have is conf licted, fragmented, and disjointed, or existential 
mental states that are indistinct and unclear.
9 I am thinking of Senator Christopher J. Dodd, the Democrat from Connecticut, who 
called the housing crisis “entirely foreseeable and preventable, not an act of God,” dur-
ing the Wall Street testimonies before the Senate in 2008 that seemed to  suggest the 
contrary.
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Mihkelson and Sebald feel they are writing in a time that gives no guarantees 
that what they write will endure any more than anything else will that had 
hitherto seemed permanent or long-lasting. In all of Sebald’s work, the drive to 
recount what is actively slipping or wearing away, or being destroyed, or already 
half-forgotten, or ruined by writing itself, is immense and overwhelming. 
Worst is that art itself destroys, for even as it preserves, it destroys and replaces 
in that same act what was irreplaceable lived experience, as he lets Marie Henri 
Beyle (i.e. Stendhal) realize in Vertigo. (Sebald 1999: 7–8) Mihkelson’s narrator 
questions whether her written images and representations have the power to 
convey what existed and no longer is: “Have I any hope of ever reaching even 
the rim of the incomprehensible forgotten in spacetime.” In lieu of an answer, 
she notes “that what has survived as an image or a symbol, that simply stays, 
like a long dead horse, standing always at that gate in the enclosed pasture that 
points homeward, when you gaze at that pasture’s erstwhile dwelling or the 
ruins of its home” (14). Language immobilizes and produces as if a still life 
painting or photograph that no longer awakens memory or history. Language is 
enfeebled, abused by the instrumental use made of it by capitalism and politics, 
and every kind of articulation seems intertwined with fantasies, errors, lies, 
and madness, arising from human debility and need. Similarly, every kind of 
knowledge is a series of systems of interpretation that turn out to be in need of 
correction, or that have failed, wholly or in part.
The historical causations and sequences, for one, that we formerly posited 
appear as only so many dubious hypotheses or myths, based on extremely 
f lawed and partial material, as Daniel Lord Smail has argued. Or as he curtly 
puts it: “History happens.” (2008: 57) Sebald agrees: “On the whole, the 
thing [history] evolves under its own steam.... There is little that we can do 
to steer it.” (Schwartz 2007: 102–103) Historical breaks seemingly happen as 
geological ones do and severed tectonic plates cannot be fitted back together 
again. The lingering idea that history is something that we can or readily 
should “make”, in the revolutionary way Marx, for one, recommended, and 
believed we could, seems infinitely distant, even preposterous, to the thinking 
of both Mihkelson and Sebald. “As yet, the memory of both periods of the past 
persisted in me,” says Mihkelson’s narrator, referring to the historical break 
that now divides a liberated, independent Estonia from its time under the fifty 
year-long communist occupation, but “the memory is like a compressed pod, 
the sides of which no longer fit together” (273). Mentally and emotionally, she 
lives in many other simultaneous moments of past and present time, as one 
does in a dream (12). She makes great efforts to find links, but too many are 
missing to establish coherency, and a fundamental sense of nonrelationships 
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remains that is as profound and unbridgeable as the one between herself and 
Sanna, her mother, and herself and Kaata, her aunt.
We posit all kinds of theories and narratives about history and ourselves 
because we need somehow “to make sense of our nonsensical existence,” says 
Sebald, “and so we build. I think all our philosophical systems, all our systems 
of creed, all our constructions, even the technological ones, are built in that 
way, in order to make some sort of sense, which there isn’t, as we all know.” 
(Schwartz 2007: 97) Our illusory fantasies, such as those of the great Don 
Quixote of Cervantes, as well as our more seriously delusional constructions 
and psychotic deliria are all part of that same, common need for sense building 
and reason giving, concurs Jacques-Alain Miller (Miller 2009: 152; also Jaanus 
2013). There is a common Sisyphean effort to veil or fill a recurring “blank 
of sense” with some kind of foundational knowledge, which Mihkelson and 
Sebald strain initially to do, until they realize that far more grave, in fact, 
necessitous is filling in the blank of feelings.
Initially, both narrators believe that “[T]he unendurable is the consequence 
of my deficient knowledge,” as Mihkelson’s narrator says (206). There is, 
therefore, in both an intense, even dire need for knowledge and learning – for 
archival research, for historical truth, for facts, and proof – but these pursuits, 
as both discover, are also their way of avoiding a deeper, unacknowledged 
knowledge that what they seek is actually unavailable and unattainable. The 
narrator in Katkuhaud comes to know that between Kaata’s schizophrenic 
prevarications and theatrical pretenses and her mother’s paranoid hatred, 
rejection, and sadistic refusal to divulge any information, even to her own 
daughter  – together with the contradictions between what she learns from 
the many persons she interviews and the facts in the archival documents that 
she reads (that may, however, have been falsified) – she will never know the 
truth about her past history or more specifically her own history or known 
what she would like to know about her father, about when or how he died, who 
killed him, or who he was and what he lived and died for. Austerlitz admits 
that the “accumulation of knowledge which he had pursued for decades” 
served merely as “a substitute” for memories that had been deleted. He comes 
to believe that his compulsive studies and in-depth knowledge of railroad 
stations, labyrinthine fortresses, and prisons provided him only with what he 
calls “a compensatory memory”, though he has an uncanny feeling that it is 
all guided by “an impulse that he himself does not understand” (Sebald 2001: 
140). Mihkelson’s narrator tells us that she chose knowledge as a substitute for 
knowing herself: “I studied and forbade myself to think of my situation.” (38) 
But what is a psychic life of substitute memories or of missing self-knowledge 
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because something more basic in oneself is missing or deleted? As both acquire 
more knowledge and come to see its limits, their excavations come ever closer 
to the space of the real in their lived lives. Ultimately, they accept that they exist 
in a broken world of lost origins and ends: a Miltonic Paradise Lost without a 
Paradise Regained, a Dantesque Inferno without the Purgatorio and Paradiso that 
should follow. Austerlitz will never recover in his mind a memory image of his 
mother no matter with what heartbreaking intensity he searches for her in the 
contexts, the places, and filmic remnants of her time of life that could possibly 
help to awaken his memory of her. Austerlitz wants to see and feel the presence 
of his mother, Agáta, and have her as if come towards him out of the frame of 
the photographs and the scraps of film that he searches through, but it never 
happens. The pain and shock of separation that burned up his memories during 
the Kindertransport are massive and permanent. (Sebald 2001: 224–225) 
“But neither Agáta nor Vera nor I myself emerged from the past. Sometimes 
it seemed as if the veil would part…but as soon as I tried to hold one of the 
fragments fast, or get it into better focus, as it were, it disappeared into the 
emptiness revolving over my head.” (218–219)
Something always remains in the dark; something is always “eclipsed”. 
“Even with the help of dreams,” says Mihkelson’s narrator, “recounting life 
is not possible because even if we were capable of lacing up with all possible 
completeness what passes, moment by moment, something remains excluded, 
something always remains excluded that cannot be subjected to wording.” 
(140) Hegel believed, “The truth is the whole.” (Hegel 1967: 81) Mihkelson 
and Sebald find it is all in pieces, and in a way that is not amenable to being 
put back together into a whole. Mihkelson wonders whether the practice of 
a writer’s craft is not like trying to jump through Einstein or Minkowski’s 
four-dimensional spacetime, or through the last sliver of intense light that is 
there before the “eclipse” of the sun that occurs every day, “when the tuned 
light of the interim between morning and evening is pressed together in a 
circle of bright toil. When time jumps as if through a ring of fire in the hand 
of a magician” (140). Although she knows that closure and certainty are never 
possible because the universe of language is an open system, with the openness 
guaranteed by the opacity of the real, she welcomes that as a positive: “The 
world of the gaze and the world of words are, in any case, accompanied at 
every moment by an immeasurable and incomprehensible beyond. If it were 
otherwise, there would be no hope on earth at all.” (119) 
Mihkelson and Sebald’s art is as if a valediction to many of the ideals, 
meanings, self-definitions, and desires that have hitherto driven Western 
culture. Both exemplarily concede the limits of language, written and spoken, 
even while they continue to search for the old power of words sometimes to 
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soothe, heal, resurrect, or grant glimpses of a partial truth. Both know that 
the truth as such is distinct from knowledge and beyond their reach. It is at 
best only half-sayable (mi-dire), as Lacan believed, because words exclude 
jouissance or human passions and emotions,10 a thesis I will discuss further. 
They know that at a minimum, we cannot continue pursuing an ethics only of 
ideals, hereby agreeing with Lacan, who said: “The question of ethics is to be 
articulated from the point of view of the location of man in relation to the real,” 
which is the very reason why he believed that we are “at the end of the vein 
of humanist thought” (Lacan 1992: 11, 273).11 Mihkelson and Sebald’s works 
also depart from humanism to embrace a far darker and more negative view of 
our desires, a starker sense of time, a more contingent realism, and a far deeper 
understandingof the fragility of human love bonds.
Both Mihkelson and Sebald also know, for example, that the ancient 
supportive ideal of a compensatory justice, such as the Pauline belief in an 
economy that posits an ultimate balance, symmetry, and equivalence between 
absolute good and radical evil, has been rendered invalid (Rachline 2001: 
8–10). Though they would like to rebel and refuse a world built on injustice 
and inequality, and to reject the very possibility of a compensatory justice 
for a suffering that has already been lived through (as did Dostoevsky’s Ivan 
Karamazov), they know in advance that such a rebellious defiance would be 
utterly pointless (Dostoevsky 1976: 216–217). Instead, they seem to recognize 
from the start that their ultimate choice is to accept the impossibility of 
recompense or to destroy themselves physically or mentally in order to end a 
pain and despair that comes from the experience of a wild injustice. To such 
utter loss of faith neither Mihkelson nor Sebald succumb.
The worst loss of all for both narrators is the loss of the emotion of love. 
Perhaps, worse still is to have to doubt its very existence, as Mihkelson’s 
narrator has to, or to have no memory whatsoever of the fact that one did 
have love once, as is the case with Austerlitz, whose only abiding memory is 
the terrifying feeling of having lost something infinitely precious, without 
10 Throughout his discussion of the four discourses in Seminar XVII, Lacan argues that 
no relation between knowledge and truth is possible because the limits of language ex-
clude what he called the object a, the mute indicator of jouissance. “If there is one thing 
that our entire approach delimits…it is that the only way in which to evoke the truth is 
by indicating that it is only accessible through a half-saying [mi-dire], that it cannot be 
said completely, for the reason that beyond this half there is nothing to say. That is all 
that can be said. Here, consequently discourse is abolished.” (Lacan 2007: 51) 
11 For Lacan, the order of the unknowable real is the stark opposite of the all-knowing 
God who reigned over Renaissance Christian Humanism. For further commentary see 
Jaanus 1997: 1–18.
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knowing or feeling what that might have been. Therein lies their encounter 
and battle with despair. 
Despair is “a characteristic of our species, in evolutionary terms,” says 
Sebald, “for a number of reasons.” 
Serious fault lines run through our evolutionary history and our psyches. 
One that in particular concerns scientists, oriented towards various forms 
of evolutionary neuroscience, and both Mihkelson and Sebald, is the critical 
difference between what one could call a pre-frontal cortex body-brain, 
inherited from our mammalian ancestors, who lived in the “natural world”, and 
the frontal cortex body-brain, living more and more closely with and within 
a hyperreality – a technological and wired environment – generated by our 
brain cells. This new reality is an exciting and open one for our minds, but it 
seems at best to leave behind the emotions when it does not outright damage 
them. The emotions are what form the most essential bond between us and 
other humans as well as all else that exists in our universe. Smail for one agrees 
that “humanities deep history lies in the body,” which is older than the frontal 
cortex, and that we are shaped “by noncognitive feature of the brain, by moods, 
emotions, and feelings that have a deep evolutionary history” (112–113). In 
conf licts and clashes between the higher cognitive functions of the brain and 
its non-cognitive functions arewhere “the sources of pain” lie for both for 
Mihkelson and Sebald.
Both narrators feel inexplicable disruptions in their moods and the 
irruption of images and thoughts that they do not want. Both feel the breaks in 
momentary, positive states of mind and feeling that they would like to continue, 
but cannot make stay. The presence of such symptomatic despair interferes 
Because we have created an environment for us which isn’t what it should be. 
And we’re out of our depth all the time. We’re living exactly on the borderline 
between the natural world from which we are being driven out, or we’re driving 
ourselves out of it, and that other world which is generated by our brain cells. 
And so clearly that fault line runs right through our physical and emotional 
makeup. And probably where these tectonic plates rub against each other is 
where the sources of pain are. Memory is one of those phenomena. It’s what 
qualifies us as emotional creatures, psychozootica or however one might de-
scribe them. And I think there is no way in which we can escape it. The only 
thing that you can do, and that most people seem to be able to do very success-
fully, is to subdue it. And if you can do that by, I don’t know, playing baseball or 
watching football on television, then that’s possibly a good thing, I don’t know. 
(Schwartz 2007: 56)
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with any possibility of pleasure, peace, and stability, or worse, it leads to periods 
of total collapse that happen both to Austerlitz and the narrator in Mihkelson.
During a crucial phase in her tormented dialogues with her aunt Kaata, 
Mihkelson’s narrator is present only as a grammatical question mark. A 
question mark is not a verbal sound or phoneme that can be connected to 
another phoneme so as to make a resounding emotional chain, as Joyce does 
in Finnegans Wake, nor does it produce a sense or yield up enough intelligible 
signifiers to make a signifying chain of meanings. It marks an absence of all 
sound and sense. It produces no metaphoric or metonymic movement, desire, 
or time. Rather, it arrests movement and meaning, as all punctuation marks do 
to different degrees, from the comma that is a short pause to the period that 
is a full stop: ,– :;? ! . The narrator’s mark represents her very being as absent, 
and what might have been her question as absent and missing as well. She is 
as if a question that is not asked and cannot be asked. Her existence only as a 
mark registers a bewildered, speechless, and utterly inarticulate state of mind. 
It evidences a desubjectification and helplessness that signals her entry into 
the real. The real, said Lacan, is only opened up by writing (Lacan 1973–1974: 
lesson of February 12, 1974). Punctuation marks are the purest writing or 
what is only written in any text. Making some last, repeated marks, as if on the 
doorway into the real, is seemingly all that the narrator can, at this moment, 
do before falling, like an object, into a black void. These marks, written on the 
edges of the hole that Kaata’s revelations have just carved into her innermost 
being, bespeak to this experience as one of near self-annihilation or death that 
the narrator had intimated was to be hers at the very beginning: “In anticipation 
I could say that to this place, in just such weather, I came to die. But then, I did 
not know that.” (15) 
These pure question marks go far beyond Socrates’ experience of his 
ignorance and emptiness. For at the same moment that Socrates declared his 
ignorance as his foundation, he filled the hole of that ignorance with questions. 
Questioning the youth of Athens became his passion and his mission and, in a 
sense, the “answer” to his ignorance and emptiness. It healed what disturbed 
him, or what did not work in him, namely his symptomatic ignorance, and as 
if sutured this wound in his being. It was his invention of what we now call the 
Socratic method of teaching and an example of what Lacan calls a sinthome, 
the creative invention of an activity – a product or a work – that gives a function 
and meaning to a senseless symptom, and makes a symptomatic sense of 
purposelessness, emptiness, or non-identity bearable.  
In contrast to Socrates, Mihkelson’s narrator and Sebald’s protagonists 
feel at times not only that they do not have the right questions, but that the 
questions that need to be asked have not yet been invented or have been posed 
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in a weak form, without sufficient urgency. Such questions that Austerlitz and 
the narrator do raise often turn out to be unanswerable or the answers are 
horrifying. In Katkuhaud, the series of question marks register the narrator’s 
gradual discovery of what the autobiography of her life with her mother and 
her aunt, the two women, who were responsible for her care as a child, had 
been in reality and who in truth they were, contrary to everything that she had 
hitherto believed. It is the opening to a horrendous abyss of betrayal, crime, and 
murder. One wonders what could possibly help the narrator emerge from this 
total eclipse of what had hitherto been her sense of her existence? Was there a 
memory that could “come like a rope let down from heaven to draw [her] up out 
of the abyss of not-being”, as happens to Proust’s Marcel (Proust 1982: 5–6)?12 
Where is the fragment of jouissance that might knot itself to her trauma so as to 
make her once again feel alive and happy, and capable of creativity and action?
The extraordinary work of Jaak Panksepp has for a long time been in 
the field of the neuroevolutionary origins of human emotion. His recently 
published The Archaeology of Mind, together with Lucy Biven, reaffirms that 
the “neocortex is responsible for almost all of the cultural milestones that 
human beings have been able to achieve”, but his fundamental thesis is that 
what is more foundational is more ancient than the frontal cortex: 
The cortex could achieve nothing without an evolved foundational mind deep-
er in the brain. Those ancient ancestral neural territories below the neocortex 
constitute our ancestral mind – the affective mind … that we share with many 
other animals. It is “archeological treasure”, for it contains the sources of some 
of our most powerful feelings. Those ancient subcortical brain systems are 
precious, multihued “jewels” for anyone wishing to understand the roots of all 
basic values we have ever known and will experience in our lives. The affects 
are the foundations upon which the beauty and the ugliness of life has been 
constructed. (Panksepp & Biven 2012: x)
It is precisely a disturbance and ruination on the level of these deeper and 
more “ancient ancestral neural territories” that constitute the sufferings of 
both Mihkelson and Sebald’s narrators. Both are, essentially, in search of lost 
“archeological emotions” that could help restore their  “affective mind”, or one 
can perhaps simply say their heart – once, initially, filled with hope, belief and 
love, before it was broken. Their search sets them out on a journey or “hunt”, 
12 For Mihkelson, the author, as distinct from the narrator, the answer is clear, as it was 
in the case of Goethe and his hero, Werther, in Die Leiden des jungen Werthers. Their 
“rope” is their absolute mastery of language, and their passion for it.
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as Mihkelson terms it, that becomes emotionally torrential and, literally, a 
battle for the survival or the recovery of any bits and pieces of the emotional 
self that they would need to feel better. Both have to find something or a way to 
overcome the ravage and destruction of their field of childhood joy.
Mihkelson and Sebald confront despair, but in a way that is very different 
from how, for example, more than a century and a half earlier, Kierkegaard 
and Georg Büchner or even later, in 1922, Alban Berg’s dread-inspiring opera, 
Wozzeck, based on Büchner’s Woyzeck, confronted it. Kierkegaard speaks 
openly of his terror of the void: “If there were no eternal consciousness in man, 
if at the foundation of all there lay only a wildly seething power, which writhing 
with obscure passions produced everything that is great and everything that is 
insignificant, if a bottomless void never satiated lay hidden beneath all – then 
what would life be but despair?” (Kierkegaard 1968: 30) The despair inspired 
by such an insatiable void seething with obscure passions (comparable to 
Schopenhauer’s will or to the psychosis that Büchner’s Woyzeck succumbs to) 
could, for Kierkegaard, only be filled and soothed by a belief in God’s infinity 
and the belief that a matching spiritual infinite resides within ourselves. 
Mihkelson and Sebald have, however, set themselves the task of looking 
precisely at such a void, with anguish, yes, and with what is at times a towering 
and overwhelming fear, but without the nihilism of Schopenhauer or that 
of Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens, or the suicidal melancholia that haunts 
Hamlet, or the guilt, punishments, and self-deprivations of a Augustine or a 
Kierkegaard.  Although Mihkelson and Sebald know that our mental stability 
is precarious and that contemporary cultural reality does not provide adequate 
protection against the real, they stay to ref lect on the black sounds and black 
holes of history and of the self, without which no post-humanistic art seems 
worthwhile or true.
Mihkelson and Sebaldpersist with what seems to be an extraordinary 
lucidity, a gratitude for words despite their limits, and a new metaphysical 
courage that is difficult to define but that is way beyond the boundary of what 
earlier humanists found tolerable. They know that the quest for definitive 
philosophic answers is over but they allow for the soul’s need for metaphysical 
questioning to continue. For Sebald it is a speculation “beyond one’s ken”, but 
it is deeply human. He said, “I’ve always thought it very regrettable and, in a 
sense, also foolish, that the philosophers decided somewhere in the nineteenth 
century that metaphysics wasn’t a respectable discipline and had to be thrown 
overboard, and reduced themselves to becoming logicians and statisticians. 
It seemed a very poor diet, somehow, to me. So metaphysics, I think, is a 
legitimate concern.” (Schwartz 2007: 115) Both Mihkelson and Sebald know 
that we need to ask unanswerable questions, somewhat like children do. Sebald 
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put it like this: “I am not seeking an answer. I just want to say, ‘This is very 
odd, indeed’.” (Schwartz 2007: 165). It is an ordinary, quotidian way of saying 
what Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason addressed more loftily as the “peculiar 
fate” of our reason that “it is always troubled with questions which cannot be 
ignored, because they spring from the very nature of reason, and which cannot 
be answered, because they transcend the powers of human reason” (1966: xxii).
Paz shares the same belief that the great metaphysical questions “that for 
centuries scientists have ignored, considering them outside their jurisdiction 
or else superf luous, contradictory, meaningless,” need to be taken up again 
in the light of new information produced by science (Paz 1995: 245). Paz 
himself raises a great and fundamental question for our age by asking, “Can 
a civilization be founded on a neural construction?” (Ibid. 242.) Will the idea 
of the human person endowed with freedom cease to be once consciousness is 
realized “as an illusion, an artifice” or “as a neurological orchestra” (ibid. 242, 
240)? Paz’s tentative answer is that much scientific knowledge has often turned 
out to be merely provisional or approximate and that the radical singularity 
of minds very likely dooms a scientific description of the mind as such to be 
unachievable. However, he concludes: “It seems to me the time is ripe for 
embarking on a philosophical inquiry, based on contemporary science, that 
will shed light on the questions that have always been of passionate concern 
to human understanding: the origin of the universe and of life, our place in the 
cosmos, the relation between the part of us that thinks and the part that feels, 
the dialogue between body and soul.” (Ibid. 246.)
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